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market shock to the observable environmental quality of VW diesel vehicles. To inves-
tigate the market reaction to this shock, we collect data from a used-car online adver-
tisement platform. We find that the supply of used VW diesel vehicles increases after
the VW emission scandal. The positive supply side effects increase with the probability
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1 Introduction
Automobile emissions are partly responsible for air pollution and global warming. If car owners
care about the emissions of their cars, we expect the used-car market to react to the arrival
of new information about the emissions of cars. One possible reaction is sorting based on
preferences for environmental quality (see, e.g., Hendel and Lizzeri, 1999, for a comprehensive
discussion of sorting in markets for durable goods under heterogeneous preferences). Car
owners with high preferences for environmental quality could sell their cars to individuals
with low preferences for environmental quality.
In this study, we exploit the decline in the observed environmental quality of Volkswagen
(VW) diesel cars after the disclosure of the stunning VW emissions scandal to investigate re-
actions to information disclosure. On September 18, 2015, the US Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) disclosed the installation of defeat device software in the emission control sys-
tems of VW diesel engines (EPA, 2015). This disclosure reduced the observable environmental
quality of VW diesel cars because the defeat device negatively affects the environmental and
engine performance of the manipulated cars. Furthermore, the durability of several parts of
the exhaust system (e.g., the catalytic converter) could significantly decline after retrofitting,
thus increasing maintenance costs. Since market participants did not expect the informa-
tion revealed by this disclosure, the resulting decline in observable environmental quality is a
quasi-experimental exogenous shock to the used-car market.
Several studies show that car buyers’ willingness to pay is sensitive to fuel prices (e.g.,
Allcott and Wosny, 2013; Busse et al., 2013; Sallee et al., 2016). These studies argue that
car buyers take the future fuel costs of vehicles with different fuel economies into account. In
contrast to these studies, we investigate the reactions of potential car sellers to information
disclosure about the environmental quality of cars, which is related to fuel economy.
Tadelis and Zettelmeyer (2015) investigate the random disclosure of information (for poten-
tial bidders) about the quality of used cars during online auctions. The unexpected disclosure
of new information increases sales probability and revenue for sellers. Surprisingly, the results
2
remain the same regardless of whether the disclosed information increases or decreases the
observable quality. They argue that the (re-) sorting of bidders with heterogeneous quality
preferences increases competition, even if the new information reveals low quality. In contrast
to Tadelis and Zettelmeyer (2015), we investigate a sorting mechanism on the supply side and
focus on aspects related to environmental quality.
Peterson and Schneider (2014) investigate the defect probability of different car compo-
nents and the corresponding turnover rates for different car models. Components with a high
probability of an easily detectable defect increase the turnover rates of cars. This is evidence
for sorting on the supply side with respect to observable car quality. However, it is difficult
to test the causal effect of information disclosure on the supply of used cars because we are
usually unable to observe exogenous variation in observable used-car quality. Furthermore,
Peterson and Schneider (2014) do not consider car components that affect the environmental
quality of cars.
We base our analyses on data collected from a large German online car advertisement
portal. The volume of this online market is approximately 3.6 million cars per year, which
reflects a trade value of 40 billion euros per year or 50% of the German used-car market.1
Our sample contains 1.1 million newly offered cars between August 2015 and April 2016.
Furthermore, we observe detailed car and seller characteristics. We employ difference-in-
differences estimators to investigate asking prices and market shares of diesel cars by carmakers
and time periods before and after the disclosure of the VW emission scandal. In particular, we
use unconditional and conditional differences-in-differences estimators. In the latter approach,
we account for important variables that could affect the structure of the used-car market.
For this purpose, we use semi-parametric radius matching estimators with bias adjustment
(Lechner et al., 2011).
We find that the supply of used VW diesel cars increases significantly after the disclosure
of the emission manipulation scandal. The positive supply effects increase with the probability
1The German Federal Motor Transport Authority (Kraftfahrtbundesamt) documents 3 million first-time
registered cars and 7 million ownership transfers of cars during the year 2014 (Kraftfahrtbundesamt, 2017).
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of manipulation. Furthermore, we find evidence of negative effects on asking prices for cars
with a high probability of manipulation. We rationalize these findings using Peterson and
Schneiders (2016) model of sorting in durable goods markets.
We provide evidence that spillover effects to non-manipulated VW diesel cars do not explain
an increase in the supply or decline in the asking price of used cars. This mitigates the
plausibility of several alternative explanations for our findings, for example, that the overall
reliability of diesel cars decreases after the disclosure of the scandal or that mainly risk averse
car owners bring their used cars to market.
Furthermore, we provide evidence that these results are strongly driven by the supply of
minivans and sport utility vehicles (SUVs). Both vehicle classes are heavy polluters. Compact
cars drive the negative asking price effects. Finally, we show that it is mainly professional car
dealers who do not offer a warranty that increase their supply of VW diesel vehicles after the
disclosure of the VW emission scandal.
In the next section, we introduce the background of the VW emission scandal. In Section
3, we introduce a small sorting model. In Section 4, we describe the data. In Section 5, we
describe our empirical strategy. In Section 6, we report the empirical results. In Section 7, we
discuss alternative explanations for our findings. The final section concludes the paper. We
provide additional material in Online Appendices A-E.
2 The VW emission scandal
Many countries use emission standards to limit toxic and greenhouse gases in automobile
exhaust. In the last two decades, the European Union and the US significantly reduced the
nitrogen oxide (NOx) limits for automobile exhaust (see Online Appendix A for details).
Car manufacturers had to improve the emission control technology in their cars. In 2007,
the US authorities certified the VW diesel engine EA 189 under the strictest nitrogen oxide
limits at the time. The engine achieved low nitrogen emissions with a nitrogen oxide storage
catalytic converter (see, e.g., Yang et al., 2015, for details). This converter stores nitrogen
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oxide in a catalyst material (often barium) and converts it into nitrogen (N2) and carbon
dioxide (CO2). The conversion process requires the injection of additional fuel to regenerate
the catalytic converter, which increases fuel consumption. The converter has a low durability,
especially when the injected fuel includes high amounts of sulfur.2
However, the EA 189 engine has a defeat device for the emission control system. The defeat
device software recognizes when a car is on the test stand. In test stand mode, the emission
control system operates optimally. However, the capacity of the emission system is reduced
or completely switched off when the car is not on the test stand (see, e.g., Thompson et al.,
2014). VW sold 11 million cars worldwide with defeat devices (2.4 million cars in Germany).
Before the EPA disclosed the installation of the defeat device software, only a small number
of managers and EPA officers were aware of the emission test manipulations (Clemente and
Gabbioneta, 2017). The nitrogen oxide emissions of cars with a defeat device exceed official
limits by up to 40 times (New York Times, 2015). Within days of the disclosure, VW shares
lost more than 20% of their value (approximately 15 billion euros), and the CEO of VW
(Martin Winterkorn) resigned (Stanwick and Stanwick, 2017). Since October 2, 2015, VW
customers have been able to check an online portal to see if their car has a defeat device.
On October 30, 2015, VW submitted retrofitting plans for cars in Germany, but considerable
uncertainty remains. Although retrofitting is mandatory in Germany, many cars still have the
defeat device. It appears that some cars only require a software update, while other cars need
a serious engine retrofit.
On April 23, 2016, Der Spiegel headlines revealed that Bosch AG (a German automotive
supplier) delivered the defeat devices not only to VW but also to many other car producers
worldwide (Spiegel, 2016).3 On October 25, 2016, US courts and VW agreed on a compen-
sation payment of 15 billion US dollars to US customers (approximately 480,000 cars with
defeat devices were sold in the US; see, e.g. Stanwick and Stanwick, 2017). This includes the
costs of retrofitting, buybacks, and individual compensation of between 5,000 and 10,000 US
2An alternative technology is the selective catalytic reduction converter, which injects urea to lower nitrogen
oxide emissions. Urea is sold under the brand name Ad Blue. Ad Blue has to be refilled regularly.
3Der Spiegel is an important weekly news magazine in Germany.
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dollars.
To date, there is still no clear decision about the obligation of VW towards misled cus-
tomers in Germany. German laws do not force VW to repurchase diesel cars or to pay notable
amounts of individual compensation. Nevertheless, VW has negotiated with various govern-
ment institutions about retrofitting plans and other remedies. The latter usually consist of
free software updates for cars with defeat devices. In exceptional cases, hardware components
are also retrofitted. VW covers the costs of retrofitting but not necessarily of the increased
maintenance costs due to retrofitting. German courts have had to address mass complaints
by VW customers, but there was no clear court decision as of mid-2019. The disclosure of
the VW emission scandal affects the observable quality of VW diesel cars. The defeat devices
could directly affect the environmental performance, power, and/or fuel consumption of the
vehicle. Owners of manipulated cars must visit the garage for retrofitting, which is time con-
suming. Moreover, the durability of the exhaust gas recirculation valve, the particulate filter,
and the catalytic converter could significantly decline after retrofitting. It appears that VW
car owners have to bear at least some of the (direct or indirect) costs.
The image of VW diesel cars declined after the disclosure of the emission manipulation
scandal (Clemente and Gabbioneta, 2017; Stanwick and Stanwick, 2017). Furthermore, the
emission scandal could have had spillover effects on VW gasoline cars, as well as diesel cars
from other producers (Clemente and Gabbioneta, 2017). For example, the image of diesel cars
could have declined, and individuals could have updated their expectations about future car
quality fraud revelations. We assume that the decline in observable quality is stronger for VW
diesel than for other carmakers, such that the relative loss in observable quality is negative
for VW diesel cars.
Table 1 shows trends in the German car market between 2008 and 2017. Since 2013,
registrations of new gasoline and diesel cars have increased. This trend continued for gasoline
cars after the disclosure of the VW emission scandal, but the registrations of new diesel cars
remained stable in 2015 and 2016 and declined in 2017. The number of gasoline car ownership
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transfers has been stable since 2008. In contrast, the number of diesel car ownership transfers
exhibits an increasing trend, which was not interrupted after the disclosure of the VW emission
scandal. Owners decommission their cars because they want to either scrap or sell them at a
later point in time. While the share of gasoline car decommissions remains stable over time,
we observe an increasing trend in the decommissioning of diesel cars that was not interrupted
by the VW emission scandal. It appears that the VW emission scandal had a clear, negative
impact on the new car market for diesels, but it is difficult to draw conclusions about the used
car market from this macro perspective.
Table 1 around here
3 Sorting
We use a simplified version of Peterson and Schneider’s (2016) model for sorting in durable
goods markets to obtain a rationale for the potential effects of the VW emission scandal on
the used car market (see also Hendel and Lizzeri, 1999, 2002). The parameters of the model
are as follows: Potential used-car sellers own one used car each. Potential used-car buyers
are not endowed with any car. A potential used-car seller has the taste for quality θ that is
drawn from the uniform distribution [1, θH ]. The cumulative distribution of potential used-car
sellers with taste for quality θ is H(θ) = (θ − 1)/(θH − 1). All potential used-car buyers have
the taste for quality θ = 1. The taste for the quality of potential buyers is lower than that
of potential sellers, which reflects their willingness to buy cars that have been discarded by
the potential car sellers. We assume that the number of potential used-car buyers exceeds the
number of potential used-car sellers.
Let Q > 0 be the quality of a used car (including environmental quality), which is ob-
servable for potential sellers and buyers. The utility of owning a car for a driver with taste θ
is θQ. Drivers gain zero utility from owning a second car. Potential sellers have the option
to replace their used car with a new car. The quality of a new car is QN with QN > Q.
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The price of a new car is PN . We assume that the new car market is competitive, such that
QN and PN are exogenous and not influenced by the used-car market.
4 Furthermore, we
assume that θHQN > PN > QN , which implies that it is efficient for some potential sellers
to replace their used car with a new one. Because we assume that the number of potential
used-car buyers exceeds the number of potential used-car sellers, the market price of used
cars equals the potential buyers’ reservation prices, which are proportional to the observed
car qualities. The used-car market price is P (Q) = Q because θ = 1 for potential buyers of
used cars. Accordingly, the marginal effects of observed quality on used-car prices are positive
(∂P (Q)/∂Q = 1). This suggests that a lower observable environmental quality would have a
negative impact on the prices of used cars.
Potential sellers have an incentive to sell their used car and buy a new car when the utility
from driving the new car, θQN , minus the price differential between the prices of the new and
the used cars, (PN − P (Q)), exceeds the utility from driving the used car, θQ. The utility of
trade is u(Q) = θ(QN − Q) − (PN − Q). The marginal effect of the observed quality on the
utility of trade is negative,
∂u(Q)
∂Q
= 1− θ < 0.
This suggests that a decline in observed environmental quality would increase the utility of
trade. This would imply that an owner of a VW diesel vehicle generates more utility from
trade after the emission scandal. Potential sellers offer their car on the used car market when
the utility of trade is positive. This suggests that a decline in the observable environmental
quality increases the probability of supplying used cars.
4This is a strong simplifying assumption. However, if an interaction between the new and used car market
biased our empirical results, then we would expect to find positive supply effects for manipulated and
non-manipulated VW diesel vehicles. We show that the positive supply effects occur only for cars with a
high manipulation probability, which mitigates concerns about such a bias.
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4 Data
We collect our data from a large German online car advertisement platform. Private car
owners and firms offer their cars for sale on this platform. They usually post several pictures
and detailed descriptions of the offered car together with an asking price. Potential buyers can
search for cars on this platform. When they find an appropriate car, they contact the seller
directly. The seller and potential buyer may arrange a meeting, which gives the potential
buyer the possibility to inspect the car. They then negotiate mutually over the transaction
price, which can deviate from the asking price.5 If the seller and buyer agree on the terms of
the trade, then they legally transfer ownership of the car.
4.1 Selection of the estimation sample
Our sample covers the daily inflow of used cars from August 26, 2015, to April 15, 2016. The
sample period ends one week before Der Spiegel headlines revealed that Bosch AG delivered
defeat devices to many car producers worldwide (Spiegel, 2016). We analyze only used cars
with diesel or gasoline engines. We omit cars with a mileage above 200,000 km or that are
older than 20 years. Table 2 shows the five different vehicle classes we consider. The inflow
sample contains 1,108,566 vehicles. The sample consists mainly of compact and medium-sized
vehicles. We focus on nine common carmakers in Germany. The inflow sample includes 427,286
(39%) VW, 182,393 (16%) BMW, 136,613 (13%) Opel, 136,393 (12%) Mercedes-Benz, 134,200
(12%) Ford, 33,585 (3%) Toyota, 25,703 (2%) Renault, 19,585 (2%) Peugeot, and 12,808 (1%)
Fiat vehicles.
Table 2 around here
5We do not observe transaction prices in the data.
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4.2 Descriptive Statistics
Table 3 shows the descriptive statistics for vehicles from VW and other carmakers. The share
of diesel vehicles is slightly above 50%. The first asking price does not differ between VW
and other cars. The offered VW cars are somewhat newer than the offered vehicles from
other carmakers. The average age of VW cars is three years, and the average mileage is
approximately 60,000 km. The average age of the other carmakers is almost 4 years, and the
average mileage is approximately 67,000 km; 76% of the VW cars and 61% of the vehicles
from other carmakers have a full service history. Approximately 10% of the sellers offer a
warranty to purchasers. In Germany, new cars undergo a general inspection after three years
and must revisit the general inspection every subsequent second year. Approximately 20%
of the offered cars have a new general inspection, which is valid for two years. For another
57% of the VW cars and 49% of the vehicles from other makers, the duration until the next
inspection becomes due is more than one year. The share of cars offered by private sellers
is approximately 10%. Most car bodies are limousines or estate cars. The VW cars in the
sample are more often regulated under the more recent emission standards than the vehicles
from other carmakers, which reflects the younger age of the VW cars in the sample. Some
German cities have environmental zones. Cars are only allowed to enter these zones when
they have a special tag on the windshield that indicates low particulate matter emissions.
The lowest particulate matter emissions is indicated by a green tag. Over 80% of the offered
cars have such a green particulate matter tag.
Table 3 around here
4.3 Time trends
Figure 1 shows the number of newly incoming diesel cars used per week. We distinguish among
VW, other German, and non-German car makes. We observe high seasonal fluctuations,
especially around Christmas and Easter. Figure 2 reports a similar time pattern for the inflow
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of used gasoline cars. Accordingly, a comparison of the inflow of used cars before and after the
emission scandal would capture these seasonal fluctuations. In contrast, Figure 3 documents
that the share of newly incoming diesel cars is more stable over time by car make. The share of
non-German diesel cars appears to be stable over time. The share of VW diesel and the share
of other German diesel cars have humped shaped patterns after the VW emission scandal.
The humped shaped pattern is more pronounced for the share of VW than other German
diesel cars.
Figures 1, 2, and 3 around here
The average first asking price is 16,732 euros, and the average final asking price is 16,350
euros. Accordingly, the average discount is 381 euros or 2% of the first asking price. The
first and final asking prices differ for only 31% of the offered cars. We focus on the first
asking price because given the timing of our data, the final asking price could already be
contaminated (when the car was online before the disclosure of the VW emission scandal
and sold afterwards). Unfortunately, we do not know how close the asking and transaction
prices are. For the French new car market, D’Hautefoeuille et al. (2018) find that car buyers
obtain an average discount of 10% from the list price. Furthermore, they find considerable
heterogeneity in the discount rate with respect to buyer and car characteristics.
Figure 4 shows the weekly average first asking prices of diesel cars by car make. The asking
price is much higher for German than non-German car makes. We observe a price dip during
the Christmas week. Other than that, the average first asking prices are remarkably stable
over time. Figure 5 shows a similar pattern for gasoline cars.
Figures 4 and 5 around here
We calculate the duration between the first and last day online. We observe that more than
95% of the car advertisements are no longer online after a period of 4 months. However, we
observe cars for at most 24 days before the disclosure of the VW emission scandal. The online
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duration is contaminated when the car advertisement was uploaded before the disclosure of
the VW emission scandal and deleted afterwards. To account for this, we calculate Kaplan-
Meier survival rates for the first 24 days online. Figures 6-9 show that the online duration is
slightly longer after than before the disclosure of the VW emission scandal. This difference is
somewhat more pronounced for VW than non-VW cars.
Figures 6, 7, 8, and 9 around here
5 Empirical approach
We compare the share and asking prices of diesel cars before and after the disclosure of the
emission scandal and between VW and the other carmakers.6 We consider the share and not
the quantity of diesel cars because general market conditions affect the share less (e.g., the
used car market shows strong seasonality). The dummy variable D, d ∈ 0, 1, defines diesel
(D = 1) and gasoline cars (D = 0). The variable Y is the first asking price (in euros). We
distinguish eight time periods in our analyses, T , t ∈ 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7. The first time period
t = 0 is just before the VW emission scandal was disclosed. The other periods indicate the
first seven months after the disclosure. Furthermore, we distinguished between two groups,
G, g ∈ 0, 1. The first group includes VW cars (g = 1), and the second group includes cars
from other carmakers (g = 0). The share of diesel vehicles by group and time is indicated by
E[D|G = g, T = t]. We estimate the effect of the disclosure of the VW emission sandal on the
6The expected value of the diesel dummy equals the share of diesel cars. Accordingly, we can use the
individual car data to calculate the diesel share. We do not use the count of inflowing diesel cars as an
outcome variable because this would imply that we would have to aggregate the data over some periods
(e.g., days or weeks). This would result in a loss of information about the individual car characteristics.
We do not estimate the effects on the share of VW diesel cars among all diesel cars because doing so would
necessitate merging the diesel cars from all brands. In this case, we would lose the control group.
12
share of VW diesel cars by
δs =(E[D|G = 1, T = s]− E[D|G = 1, T = 0])
− (E[D|G = 0, T = s]− E[D|G = 0, T = 0]),
for s ∈ 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7. We estimate the effects on the first asking price of VW diesel cars by
αs =(E[Y |G = 1, T = s,D = 1]− E[Y |G = 1, T = 0, D = 1])
− (E[Y |G = 0, T = s,D = 1]− E[Y |G = 0, T = 0, D = 1]).
We assume that the decline in observable quality is stronger for VW diesel cars than for cars
from other carmakers. However, δs and αs are conservative estimates because other carmakers
could also be affected by the disclosure of the emission scandal. If the VW diesel scandal
affects the share of both groups in the same direction, then we underestimate the true effect.
Therefore, δs and αs could be lower bounds of the impacts of the emission scandal on the
share and asking price of VW diesel cars. Alternatively, if some individuals have a particular
preference for diesel cars, the emissions scandal might reduce the attractiveness of VW diesels
cars but increase demand for non-VW diesel cars. This increase in demand could affect the
supply and price of used cars and lead to a positive bias. In Section 6.3, we provide some
evidence against this alternative hypothesis of a positive bias by using an alternative control
group.
It could be that observable car characteristics change between the groups over time. For
example, sellers could bring older cars to market. Because diesel cars tend to have a longer life-
cycle than gasoline cars, this type of market behavior would increase the share of diesel cars.
To account for this, we define the conditional share of diesel cars E[D|G = g, T = t,X = x],
where X contains observable car and seller characteristics (see Table B.1 in Online Appendix
B for a list of all control variables we consider). We estimate the effect of the disclosure of
the emission scandal on the share of VW cars with diesel engines conditional on observable
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characteristics.
γs(x) =(E[D|G = 1, T = s,X = x]− E[D|G = 1, T = 0, X = x])
− (E[D|G = 0, T = s,X = x]− E[D|G = 0, T = 0, X = x]) and
µs(x) =(E[Y |G = 1, T = s,D = 1, X = x]− E[Y |G = 1, T = 0, D = 1, X = x])
− (E[Y |G = 0, T = s,D = 1, X = x]− E[Y |G = 0, T = 0, D = 1, X = x]).
The parameters γs(x) and µs(x) measure the effects of the emission scandal’s disclosure on
the share and asking price of VW cars with diesel engines for cars and sellers with similar
observable characteristics. We integrate the conditional effects to
γs = EX|G=1,T=0[γs(x)|G = 1, T = 0] and µs = EX|G=1,T=0,D=1[µs(x)|G = 1, T = 0, D = 1],
which are the average effects defined for cars and sellers with characteristics that are similar
to the VW group in the pre-disclosure period. Intuitively, this is the direct effect of the VW
emission scandal after controlling for other possible market distortions. If we find an effect of
the emission scandal on the share or asking price of diesel cars, even after controlling for a
large set of important observable characteristics, then this is a strong indication of sorting.
We perform estimations in separate samples for each group and each period. We estimate
the conditional moments with radius matching on the propensity score (see Lechner et al.,
2011).7 The propensity scores are parametrically specified by Probit models, and the condi-
tional expectations of the outcomes are unrestricted and thus non-parametric. The algorithm
is more precise than nearest-neighbor matching due to the idea of radius matching (e.g., De-
hejia and Wahba, 2002). Furthermore, the procedure uses the initial matching weights for a
(weighted) regression adjustment for bias reduction in a second step (see Abadie and Imbens,
2011).8 This regression adjustment should also reduce small sample and asymptotic biases of
7The (main) advantage of matching as opposed to (widely used) linear regression-based difference-in-
differences approaches is the robustness to misspecification of the linear model.
8Therefore, the estimator satisfies the so-called double robustness property, implying that it is consistent
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matching. Huber et al. (2013) investigate the finite sample properties of this algorithm along
with other matching type estimators and find it to be very competitive.
We set the radius size to 90% of the 0.9th quantile of the distance between matched
treated and control observations occurring in standard nearest-neighbor matching. Inference
is based on bootstrapping the respective effect 499 times and using the standard deviation
of the bootstrapped effects as an estimate of the standard error of the t-statistic. Abadie
and Imbens (2008) show that bootstrap-based standard errors may be invalid for matching
based on a fixed number of comparison observations. However, our matching algorithm is
smoother than the latter approach because it (by the nature of radius matching) uses a variable
number of comparisons that are distance-weighted within the radius and, moreover, applies
the regression adjustment. Therefore, the bootstrap is likely to be a valid inference procedure
for the radius matching estimator used here. It performs well in a large-scale (empirically
based) simulation study by Bodory et al. (2016), who investigate the performance of several
variance estimators in the context of propensity score-based matching estimation.
6 Results
6.1 Unconditional estimates
Figure 10 documents the unconditional estimates of supply. They reflect the difference in the
share of vehicles with diesel engines between VW and other carmakers. During the first two
months after the disclosure, we find a one-percentage-point lower share of VW diesel cars;
between months three and five, we find a one-percentage-point higher share of VW diesel cars.
In months six and seven, the difference in the shares does not differ significantly from zero.
Figure 10 around here
if either the propensity score or the regression model is correctly specified (e.g., Rubin, 1979; Joffe et al.,
2004).
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The results could reflect delay and catch-up effects. This time pattern could be due to an
initial shock of the scandal reducing the supply (possibly a response to a decrease in demand).
Once the news wears off and demand returns to levels similar to previous ones, all the cars that
were not supplied immediately after the scandal join the cars that would have been supplied in
any case, leading to an increase in supply. Then, once the ‘delayed supply’ is sold off, supply
returns to normal levels. However, sellers can advertise their cars even when there is little
demand. Furthermore, the VW scandal was not settled within six months, and it persists to
the present.
An alternative explanation for this pattern is that car owners retrofitted their manipulated
cars before selling them. However, this explanation is unlikely because the retrofitting plans
were submitted approximately 1.5 months after the revelation of the emission scandal for
approval to the German Federal Motor Transport Authority. It followed a long-lasting political
debate about the optimal retrofitting plan. To date, many manipulated cars have not received
retrofitting in Germany.
Figure 11 shows the estimates for first asking prices. The differences are mostly insignif-
icant, but we find positive asking price differences four and five months after the disclosure
of the scandal. The change in the asking prices of VW diesel cars is up to 500 euros higher
than the change in non-VW diesel cars. It is possible that VW diesel cars with better quality
(e.g., lower mileage) came to the market after the disclosure of the VW emission scandal. This
could lead to an upward bias of the asking price estimates if we do not control for important
car characteristics. We discuss the conditional effects in the next section.
Figure 11 around here
6.2 Conditional estimates
Figure 12 presents the results of the conditional difference-in-differences approach. We control
for different dummies for car age and mileage. Following the specification in Lacetera et al.
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(2012), we control for the first seven polynomials of mileage. We include dummies for vehicle
class and car body. Additionally, we include dummies for full service history, warranty, the
validity of general inspection, and private seller. We control for different emission standards
and fuel consumption of the offered car. Tables B.1-B.4 in Online Appendix B present the
balance of all control variables that we consider before matching by group and time period.
We find large imbalances, especially between the two groups of VW cars (diesel and gasoline
engines) and other carmakers. The cars from other makers are, on average, older than VW
cars. Additionally, the share of Euro 6 cars and the age of cars within the groups increases
over time. This could explain the delay and catch-up effects because, for example, used diesel
vehicles are on average older than gasoline vehicles. Furthermore, this could explain the
positive asking price estimates for VW diesel vehicles.
Figure 12 around here
We present the marginal effects of the propensity score estimates in Tables C.1-C.2 of
Online Appendix C. The propensity score estimates serve as inputs to the matching algorithm.
When performing matching, one should check for potential issues of (i) insufficient support
in the propensity scores across treatment states that may result in incomparable matches
as well as large matching weights of some non-treated observations with specific propensity
scores and (ii) imbalances in covariates after matching (due to inappropriate propensity score
specifications). To account for support problems, we drop treated observations with propensity
score values above the highest propensity score value in the control group. Lechner and
Strittmatter (2019) show that this support procedure can improve the finite sample efficiency
of the estimates. We document the distribution of the propensity scores of the observations on
support for all samples in Figures D.1-D.15 in Online Appendix D. As a final specification test,
we document the balancing of the control variables after matching in Tables E.1-E.4 of Online
Appendix E. We find only small imbalances between groups and periods. The standardized
differences are always below 10.
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The conditional results suggest no significant effects on the share of VW diesel vehicles
during the first two months after the disclosure of the emission scandal. Subsequently, we
find significant positive effects on the share of VW diesel vehicles between months 3 and 7. In
months 4 and 5, the share of VW diesel vehicles increases by 4 percentage points. In months
6 and 7, the effects on the VW diesel share decline but are still positive and significant.
Accordingly, the results are robust and even more positive after we control for a large set of
relevant covariates. The positive effects clearly dominate the insignificant effects during the
first two months. The findings cannot merely reflect delay and catch-up effects.
Figure 13 reports the conditional results for first asking prices. The conditional differences
have a much smaller magnitude than the unconditional differences and are not significantly
different from zero. This suggests that the unconditional price estimates are upward biased
because different types of cars came to market after the disclosure of the VW emission scandal.
Figure 13 around here
Table 4 documents the effects on the share of VW diesel vehicles by environmental stan-
dard. Cars with defeat devices are always regulated under the Euro 5 emission standard.
Cars with emission standards below or above Euro 5 have no defeat device. We consider the
results for those groups as a placebo sensitivity check. For VW diesel cars with an emission
standard less stringent than Euro 5, we do not find any effects. For VW diesel cars regulated
under the Euro 6 emission standard, we find negative effects six months after the disclosure.
Accordingly, the results for cars without a defeat device are either insignificant or move in the
opposite direction. This is evidence in favor of the placebo sensitivity check. In contrast, the
share of VW diesel cars regulated under the Euro 5 emission standard significantly increased
after the emission scandal, which is consistent with the predictions of the small sorting model.
Table 4 around here
Table 5 reports the estimates of the first asking price by emission standard. For VW diesel
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cars regulated under the Euro 5 emission standard, we find clear evidence for negative asking
price effects. Accordingly, the results for the VW diesel cars that have a high probability
of manipulation are in line with the predictions of the small sorting model. However, we
find positive effects on asking prices of VW diesel cars regulated under the Euro 6 emission
standard. These cars have lower emissions than Euro 5 and are supposed to have no defeat
device. It appears that the positive and negative estimates of Euro 5 and 6 cars cancel out.
This could explain why there are on average no significant differences. Professional car sellers
could make Euro 6 cars more expensive after the disclosure of the VW emission scandal to
decrease their attractiveness for potential buyers relative to Euro 5 VW diesel cars. The
results for cars with an emission standard below Euro 5 are ambiguous.
Table 5 around here
In sum, for cars with a high probability of a defeat device, we find positive supply and
negative asking price effects. These findings are consistent with the predictions of the sorting
model above. The spillover effects to not-manipulated VW diesel are inconsistent with the
predictions of the sorting model.
6.3 Alternative control group
It is challenging to find a suitable control group for difference-in-difference estimators. On the
one hand, the control and treatment groups should be similar, such that the two groups have
comparable market trends. On the other hand, overly similar control and treatment groups
could lead to spillover effects.
Figures 14 and 15 report the findings of a sensitivity test using only non-German car makes
in the control group. Arguably, non-German car makes are less affected by the disclosure of
the VW emission scandal than German car makes, but they might follow different market
trends. Qualitatively, the results are similar regardless of whether we include German cars
in the control group. However, quantitatively, the effects are slightly larger when we exclude
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German car makes, which is supporting evidence of a negative bias. Furthermore, we find
significant negative asking price estimates in the fourth month after the disclosure. The
findings of this sensitivity check suggest that the magnitudes of the main results are a lower
bound.
Figures 14 and 15 around here
6.4 Effect heterogeneity
Table 6 shows the effect of the VW emission scandal on the share of diesel cars by vehicle class.
The positive effects are mainly driven by minivans and SUVs. These cars are considered heavy
polluters because of their size and weight. Accordingly, the empirical results are coherent for
those vehicle classes that are most affected by the disclosure of the VW emission scandal.
Moreover, we also find significant positive effects on the share of diesel cars for compact and
medium-sized cars. Small cars are the only class for which we do not find a significant increase
in the share of diesel cars. If anything, we observe a negative delayed effect in the first month
after the disclosure of the emission manipulation scandal. Table 7 reports that compact cars
(VW Golf) are mainly responsible for the negative first asking price differences.
Tables 6 and 7 around here
Table 8 reports effect heterogeneity by seller type. The share of VW diesel cars does not
increase among private sellers. In contrast, the share of VW diesel cars actually declines among
private sellers. For professional car dealers, we observe a significant increase in the share of
VW diesel cars. Only in the first month after the disclosure did we find a negative delayed
effect. It is possible that VW diesel car owners more often engage professional car dealers as
sales agents, or leasing contracts are terminated instead of extended (i.e., exploiting buyback
options). The latter could occur because car lessors believe that the buyback price specified
in the leasing contract is higher than the market price after the disclosure. Furthermore, car
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owners can trade-in their used car when they buy a new car. New car buyers often have a
higher preference for quality than used car buyers. Accordingly, this explanation would be
consistent with the assumption that car owners with high quality preferences in particular
supply their cars.
Table 8 around here
Some professional car dealers provide warranties on offered used cars. The lower part of
Table 8 shows the effect heterogeneity between professional car dealers with and without an
offered warranty. For both groups, we find evidence of an increase in the share of VW diesel
vehicles. However, for professional car dealers without a warranty, the positive effect is much
more persistent across the sample period, whereas we only find significant positive effects in
the fifth month after disclosure for professional car dealers with a warranty. Accordingly,
professional car dealers who do not offer warranties are mainly responsible for the increase
in the share of VW diesel cars after the emission scandal. It appears that dealers who offer
warranties are less willing to offer these warranties on vehicles that are known to have defects
in the exhaust system.
Table 9 reports effect heterogeneity in first asking prices by seller type. However, the
results are ambiguous, and no clear pattern can be detected. If anything, it appears that
professional sellers are more willing to offer a price discount than private sellers.
Table 9 around here
7 Discussion of alternative channels
Although the positive supply and negative asking price effects are consistent with the predic-
tions of the small sorting model introduced in Section 3, alternative mechanisms could explain
similar empirical patterns. First, the quality of all diesel cars could decline after the diesel
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scandal because all diesel cars lose reputation. This is certainly the case, but we believe that
the quality loss is stronger for VW diesel cars than for other diesel and gasoline cars. The
share of non-manipulated VW diesel cars is not altered by the scandal (see Table 4), which is
evidence against strong spillover effects. Nevertheless, our results may provide a lower bound
for the effect of the VW emission scandal on the supply of used cars. The results of Section
6.3 provide suggestive evidence that spillover effects would bias our results towards zero.
Second, information about the VW scandal could be available to the car owner but may
(partially) diffuse among potential buyers over time. This could incentivize owners of manip-
ulated cars to sell early to skim naive buyers. However, the VW diesel scandal received so
much media attention that any potential buyer should have been immediately aware of it. It
is more likely that car owners of non-manipulated cars attempted to sell before the possible
revelation of further manipulations. However, we do not find such a pattern in the data (see
Table 4).
Third, risk aversion could be an alternative motive to sorting for supplying manipulated
cars. Owners who are risk averse might not want to take a risk in holding on to their manip-
ulated car, and less risk-averse buyers might be glad to accept the risk. Possibly, they do not
trust the retrofitting plans or fear future fraud revelations. In the latter case, we would expect
to find supply effects for all VW diesel cars and not only for those with a high probability of
manipulation. We cannot find evidence for this in the data (see Table 4).
8 Conclusions
We exploit the quasi-experimental decline in the observable environmental quality of VW
diesel vehicles after the disclosure of the VW emission manipulation scandal by using a con-
ditional difference-in-differences method based on semi-parametric matching estimators to
analyze German car supply around the scandal. We document supply-side reactions to the
environmental quality of cars. The supply of VW cars with a high probability of having a
defeat device increases after the disclosure of the VW emission manipulation scandal. Fur-
22
thermore, we find some evidence of negative effects of the VW emission scandal on the asking
prices of cars with a high manipulation probability.
We rationalize our findings with the predictions of a simple sorting model. Individuals
with high preferences for environmental quality could sell their VW diesel cars to individuals
with low preferences for environmental quality. This could increase the market volume even
when prices are falling.
The main takeaway of this study is that information about the environmental quality of
cars is important for the car market. This suggests that there is demand for better certification
processes for the environmental quality of cars.
A disadvantage of our study is that we only observe advertisements for and not transac-
tions of cars. Further research could investigate demand-side reactions to the disclosure of
environmental quality information.
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Figures and Tables
Figure 1: Inflow of used diesel vehicles by car make.
Notes: This figure plots the weekly inflow of used diesel vehicles by car make. Other German car makes include
Mercedes, BMW, Opel, and Ford. Non-German car makes include Renault, Peugeot, Fiat, and Toyota.
Figure 2: Inflow of used gasoline vehicles by car makes.
Notes: This figure plots the weekly inflow of used gasoline vehicles by car make. Other German car makes
include Mercedes, BMW, Opel, and Ford. Non-German car makes include Renault, Peugeot, Fiat, and Toyota.
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Figure 3: Share of inflowing used diesel vehicles by car make.
Notes: This figure plots the weekly share of inflowing used diesel vehicles by car make. Other German car
makes include Mercedes, BMW, Opel, and Ford. Non-German car makes include Renault, Peugeot, Fiat, and
Toyota.
Figure 4: Average first asking price of used diesel vehicles by car make.
Notes: This figure plots the average weekly first asking price of used diesel vehicles by car make. Other German
car makes include Mercedes, BMW, Opel, and Ford. Non-German car makes include Renault, Peugeot, Fiat,
and Toyota.
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Figure 5: Average first asking price of used gasoline vehicles by car make.
Notes: This figure plots the average weekly first asking price of used gasoline vehicles by car make. Other
German car makes include Mercedes, BMW, Opel, and Ford. Non-German car makes include Renault, Peugeot,
Fiat, and Toyota.
Figure 6: Kaplan-Meier survival curve of VW diesel vehicles.
Notes: This figure plots Kaplan-Meier survival rates of VW diesel vehicles before and after the disclosure of
the VW emission scandal. Survival rates report the share of vehicles remaining on the used car market for a
certain duration.
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Figure 7: Kaplan-Meier survival curve of VW gasoline vehicles.
Notes: This figure plots Kaplan-Meier survival rates of VW gasoline vehicles before and after the disclosure
of the VW emission scandal. Survival rates report the share of vehicles remaining on the used car market for
a certain duration.
Figure 8: Kaplan-Meier survival curve of non-VW diesel vehicles.
Notes: This figure plots Kaplan-Meier survival rates of non-VW diesel vehicles before and after the disclosure
of the VW emission scandal. Survival rates report the share of vehicles remaining on the used car market for a
certain duration. Non-VW vehicles include Mercedes, BMW, Opel, Ford, Renault, Peugeot, Fiat, and Toyota
cars.
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Figure 9: Kaplan-Meier survival curve of non-VW gasoline vehicles.
Notes: This figure plots Kaplan-Meier survival rates of non-VW gasoline vehicles before and after the disclosure
of the VW emission scandal. Survival rates report the share of vehicles remaining on the used car market for a
certain duration. Non-VW vehicles include Mercedes, BMW, Opel, Ford, Renault, Peugeot, Fiat, and Toyota
cars.
Figure 10: Difference in the share of used diesel vehicles.
Notes: This figure plots the difference-in-differences of the used car diesel share for the first seven months
after the disclosure of the VW emission scandal. The first difference is between the time before and after
the disclosure of the VW emission scandal. The second difference is between VW and other car makes. The
diamonds indicate the resulting differences in the share of used diesel vehicles. The capped vertical lines
indicate the 95% confidence intervals of the monthly averages. The confidence intervals are calculated with
a non-parametric bootstrap (499 replications). The other car makes include Mercedes, BMW, Opel, Ford,
Renault, Peugeot, Fiat, and Toyota cars.
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Figure 11: Difference in the first asking price of diesel vehicles.
Notes: This figure plots the difference-in-differences in the first asking price of used diesel vehicles for the first
seven months after the disclosure of the VW emission scandal. The first difference is between the time before
and after the disclosure of the VW emission scandal. The second difference is between VW and other car
makes. The diamonds indicate the resulting differences in the first asking price of used diesel vehicles. The
capped vertical lines indicate the 95% confidence intervals of the monthly averages. The confidence intervals
are calculated with a non-parametric bootstrap (499 replications). The other car makes include Mercedes,
BMW, Opel, Ford, Renault, Peugeot, Fiat, and Toyota diesel cars.
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Figure 12: Matched difference in the share of used diesel vehicles.
Notes: This figure plots the matched difference-in-differences of the used car diesel share for the first seven
months after the disclosure of the VW emission scandal. Diesel and gasoline cars are matched at the individual
car level such that they share the same characteristics. The first matched difference is between the time before
and after the disclosure of the VW emission scandal. The second matched difference is between VW and other
car makes. The diamonds indicate the resulting matched differences in the share of used diesel vehicles. The
capped vertical lines indicate the 95% confidence intervals of the monthly averages. The confidence intervals
are calculated with a non-parametric bootstrap (499 replications). The other car makes include Mercedes,
BMW, Opel, Ford, Renault, Peugeot, Fiat, and Toyota cars.
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Figure 13: Matched difference in the first asking price of diesel vehicles.
Notes: This figure plots the matched difference-in-differences in the first asking price of used diesel vehicles
for the first seven months after the disclosure of the VW emission scandal. Diesel cars are matched at the
individual car level such that they share the same characteristics. The first matched difference is between the
time before and after the disclosure of the VW emission scandal. The second matched difference is between
VW and other car makes. The diamonds indicate the resulting matched differences in the first asking price of
used diesel vehicles. The capped vertical lines indicate the 95% confidence intervals of the monthly averages.
The confidence intervals are calculated with a non-parametric bootstrap (499 replications). The other car
makes include Mercedes, BMW, Opel, Ford, Renault, Peugeot, Fiat, and Toyota diesel cars.
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Figure 14: Matched difference in the share of used diesel vehicles between VW and non-
German car makes.
Notes: This figure plots the matched difference-in-differences of the used car diesel share for the first seven
months after the disclosure of the VW emission scandal. Diesel and gasoline cars are matched at the individual
car level such that they share the same characteristics. The first matched difference is between the time
before and after the disclosure of the VW emission scandal. The second matched difference is between VW
and non-German car makes. The diamonds indicate the resulting matched differences in the share of used
diesel vehicles. The capped vertical lines indicate the 95% confidence intervals of the monthly averages. The
confidence intervals are calculated with a non-parametric bootstrap (499 replications). The non-German car
makes include Renault, Peugeot, Fiat, and Toyota cars.
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Figure 15: Matched difference in the first asking price of diesel vehicles between VW and
non-German car makes.
Notes: This figure plots the matched difference-in-differences in the first asking price of used diesel vehicles
for the first seven months after the disclosure of the VW emission scandal. Diesel cars are matched at the
individual car level such that they share the same characteristics. The first matched difference is between the
time before and after the disclosure of the VW emission scandal. The second matched difference is between
VW and non-German car makes. The diamonds indicate the resulting matched differences in the first asking
price of used diesel vehicles. The capped vertical lines indicate the 95% confidence intervals of the monthly
averages. The confidence intervals are calculated with a non-parametric bootstrap (499 replications). The
non-German car makes include Renault, Peugeot, Fiat, and Toyota diesel cars.
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Table 1: Trends in the German car market.
Year Registrations of New Cars Ownership Transfers Decommissions
Gasoline Diesel Gasoline Diesel Gasoline Diesel
(in 100,000) (in 100,000) (in 100,000) (in 100,000) (in 100,000) (in 100,000)
2008 17.0 13.6 46.8 13.8 53.1 21.8
2009 26.1 11.7 43.0 16.6 60.1 20.1
2010 16.7 12.2 46.9 16.7 50.5 20.7
2011 16.5 15.0 49.5 17.7 54.2 23.1
2012 15.6 14.9 48.1 19.8 54.7 24.5
2013 15.0 14.0 48.5 21.4 54.9 25.4
2014 15.3 14.5 47.3 22.2 53.3 26.8
2015 16.1 15.4 48.4 23.8 53.7 28.5
2016 17.5 15.4 48.3 24.6 53.5 30.4
2017 19.9 13.4 47.8 23.9 52.7 32.1
Notes: This table reports the number of new car registrations, ownership transfers, and decommissions in
Germany by fuel type and year. Owners decommission their cars because they wish to sell or scrap them at
a later point in time. The peak of new car registrations in 2009 is from the cash for clunkers program. Data
source: Kraftfahrtbundesamt (2017).
Table 2: Vehicle classes.
Vehicle class Considered car models Observations
Small VW Polo, Opel Corsa, Ford Fiesta, Renault Clio, Peugeot
208, Fiat Punto, Toyota Yaris
151,346 (14%)
Compact VW Golf, Mercedes A-class, BMW series 1, Opel Astra, Ford
Focus, Renault Megane, Peugeot 308, Toyota Auris
417,523 (38%)
Medium-sized VW Passat, Mercedes C-class, BMW series 3, Opel Insignia,
Ford Mondea, Peugeot 508, Toyota Avensis
286,205 (26%)
Minivan VW Sharan, VW Touran, Mercedes B-class, BMW series 2,
Opel Zafira, Ford Galaxy, Ford C-Max, Renault Scenic, Peu-
geot 5008, Fiat Doblo, Toyota Verso
148,612 (13%)
SUV VW Tiguan, Mercedes GLA, Mercedes GLK, BMW X1, Opel
Mokka, Ford Kuga, Renault Kadjar, Toyota RAV4
104,880 (9%)
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Table 3: Descriptive statistics.
Variables VW vehicles Vehicles from Standardized
other carmakers Difference
Mean Std. Err. Mean Std. Err.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Diesel 0.54 - 0.52 - 2.98
First asking price (in thsd. euros) 17.1 8.0 16.5 9.8 0.06
Car age (in years) 3.08 3.09 3.76 3.31 21.13
Mileage (in 1,000 km) 61.3 52.4 66.6 51.5 10.2
Full service history 0.76 - 0.61 - 32.03
Warranty 0.08 - 0.11 - 10.42
New general inspection 0.18 - 0.23 - 12.13
Duration until next general inspec-
tion above 1 year
0.57 - 0.49 - 14.35
Private car seller 0.10 - 0.13 - 7.32
Vehicle class
Small 0.12 - 0.15 - 6.79
Compact 0.49 - 0.31 - 36.70
Middle-sized 0.19 - 0.30 - 27.85
Minivan 0.12 - 0.14 - 4.49
SUV 0.08 - 0.10 - 6.83
Car body
Limousine 0.42 - 0.40 - 3.23
Estate 0.26 - 0.29 - 6.95
Minivan 0.10 - 0.08 - 6.16
SUV 0.08 - 0.09 - 4.48
Small 0.06 - 0.07 - 3.54
Sport 0.03 - 0.05 - 10.73
Others 0.05 - 0.01 - 22.09
Environmental standards
Below Euro 4 0.07 - 0.11 - 15.90
Euro 4 0.13 - 0.22 - 24.29
Euro 5 0.53 - 0.49 - 8.69
Euro 6 0.27 - 0.18 - 22.44
Green particulate matter tag 0.87 - 0.82 - 14.83
Fuel consumption (combined)
Below 5 liters/100km 0.35 - 0.29 - 12.89
Between 5 and 6 liters/100km 0.30 - 0.30 - 0.74
Above 6 liters/100km 0.27 - 0.30 - 7.41
Not reported 0.09 - 0.11 - 7.79
Observations 427,286 681,280
Notes: This table reports the mean car characteristics of vehicles from VW and other car makes. The
other car makes include Mercedes, BMW, Opel, Ford, Renault, Peugeot, Fiat, and Toyota cars. Columns
(2) and (4) document standard errors of continuous variables. Column (5) reports the standardized differ-
ence. The standardized difference of variable X between samples A and B is defined as SD = 100 · |X¯A −
X¯B |/
√
1/2 (V ar(XA) + V ar(XB)), where X¯A denotes the mean of sample A and X¯B denotes the mean of
sample B. Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) consider an absolute standardized difference of more than 20 as
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Table 4: Matched difference in the share of used diesel vehicles by emission standard.
Month after disclosure of the emission scandal
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Below Euro 5 -0.014 -0.018 -0.004 0.006 -0.015 -0.005 0.005
(0.014) (0.015) (0.015) (0.016) (0.015) (0.015) (0.016)
Euro 5 0.0001 0.019** 0.01 0.018** 0.038*** 0.024*** 0.004
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008)
Euro 6 -0.036 -0.012 0.01 0.025 -0.03 -0.061*** -0.032
(0.024) (0.022) (0.021) (0.023) (0.022) (0.02) (0.021)
Notes: This table reports the matched difference-in-differences of the used car diesel share for the first seven
months after the disclosure of the VW emission scandal by emission standard. Defeat devices were only
disclosed for VW diesel vehicles regulated under the Euro 5 emission standard. Diesel and gasoline cars are
matched at the individual car level such that they share the same characteristics. The first matched difference
is between the time before and after the disclosure of the VW emission scandal. The second matched difference
is between VW and other car makes. The other car makes include Mercedes, BMW, Opel, Ford, Renault,
Peugeot, Fiat, and Toyota cars. The standard errors in parentheses are calculated with a non-parametric
bootstrap (499 replications). The asterisks indicate 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% (*) significance levels.
Table 5: Matched difference in the first asking price of diesel vehicles by emission standard.
Month after disclosure of the emission scandal
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7.
(1) ) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Below Euro 5 148 -147 -106 1,242*** 67 -648** -269
(268) (272) (261) (280) (246) (238) (248)
Euro 5 -17 -287** -611*** -570*** -521*** -258* -325*
(133) (141) (144) (152) (149) (148) (155)
Euro 6 1,634*** 998** 1,299*** 2,653*** 792* 478 640
(426) (461) (436) (508) (448) (412) (441)
Notes: This table reports the matched difference-in-differences in the first asking price (in euros) of used
diesel vehicles for the first seven months after the disclosure of the VW emission scandal by emission standard.
Defeat devices were only disclosed for VW diesel vehicles regulated under the Euro 5 emission standard. Diesel
cars are matched at the individual car level such that they share the same characteristics. The first matched
difference is between the time before and after the disclosure of the VW emission scandal. The second matched
difference is between VW and other car makes. The other car makes include Mercedes, BMW, Opel, Ford,
Renault, Peugeot, Fiat, and Toyota diesel cars. The standard errors in parentheses are calculated with a non-
parametric bootstrap (499 replications). The asterisks indicate 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% (*) significance
levels.
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Table 6: Matched difference in the share of used diesel vehicles by vehicle class.
Month after disclosure of the emission scandal
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Small -0.03* -0.002 -0.023 -0.007 0.005 0.015 -0.012
(0.015) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.015) (0.016)
Compact -0.01 0.002 0.002 0.0002 -0.003 -0.009 0.023*
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.013) (0.014) (0.013)
Medium-sized -0.001 0.002 0.007 0.018 0.029** 0.008 0.015
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011) (0.013)
Minivan -0.009 0.001 0.026 0.016 0.053*** 0.068*** 0.035
(0.019) (0.019) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.022) (0.023)
SUV 0.004 0.001 0.004 0.053** 0.071*** 0.052** 0.101***
(0.021) (0.021) (0.022) (0.021) (0.024) (0.023) (0.024)
Notes: This table reports the matched difference-in-differences of the used car diesel share for the first seven
months after the disclosure of the VW emission scandal by vehicle class. Diesel and gasoline cars are matched
at the individual car level such that they share the same characteristics. The first matched difference is between
the time before and after the disclosure of the VW emission scandal. The second matched difference is between
VW and other car makes. The other car makes include Mercedes, BMW, Opel, Ford, Renault, Peugeot, Fiat,
and Toyota cars. The standard errors in parentheses are calculated with a non-parametric bootstrap (499
replications). The asterisks indicate 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% (*) significance levels.
Table 7: Matched difference in the first asking price of diesel vehicles by vehicle class.
Month after disclosure of the emission scandal
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Small 85 194 -227 149 122 -154 -287
(293) (291) (287) (279) (303) (283) (273)
Compact -54 -414** 298 -406* -505** -524** -455**
(207) (178) (223) (220) (193) (221) (204)
Medium-sized 379* 165 -67 38 -59 439* 233
(231) (223) (240) (240) (227) (227) (232)
Minivan 221 -75 -46 531* 487 306 373
(302) (290) (306) (304) (316) (297) (305)
SUV -322 -850** -421 -244 -451 -502 -316
(382) (383) (387) (398) (380) (389) (390)
Notes: This table reports the matched difference-in-differences in the first asking price (in euros) of used diesel
vehicles for the first seven months after the disclosure of the VW emission scandal by vehicle class. Diesel
cars are matched at the individual car level such that they share the same characteristics. The first matched
difference is between the time before and after the disclosure of the VW emission scandal. The second matched
difference is between VW and other car makes. The other car makes include Mercedes, BMW, Opel, Ford,
Renault, Peugeot, Fiat, and Toyota diesel cars. The standard errors in parentheses are calculated with a non-
parametric bootstrap (499 replications). The asterisks indicate 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% (*) significance
levels.
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Table 8: Matched difference in the share of used diesel vehicles by seller type.
Month after disclosure of the emission scandal
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Private seller -0.011 -0.03* -0.043** -0.033* -0.022 -0.03* -0.022
(0.018) (0.017) (0.019) (0.018) (0.018) (0.017) (0.018)
Professional car -0.017** -0.0004 0.014** 0.035*** 0.019*** 0.008 0.014**
dealer (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Professional car -0.027 -0.016 0.005 0.013 0.064*** 0.01 -0.011
dealer providing
warranty
(0.024) (0.023) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.024)
Professional car -0.011 0.001 0.015* 0.032*** 0.028*** 0.012 0.016**
dealer not provid-
ing warranty
(0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Notes: This table reports the matched difference-in-differences of the used car diesel share for the first seven
months after the disclosure of the VW emission scandal by seller type. Diesel and gasoline cars are matched at
the individual car level such that they share the same characteristics. The first matched difference is between
the time before and after the disclosure of the VW emission scandal. The second matched difference is between
VW and other car makes. The other car makes include Mercedes, BMW, Opel, Ford, Renault, Peugeot, Fiat,
and Toyota cars. The standard errors in parentheses are calculated with a non-parametric bootstrap (499
replications). The asterisks indicate 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% (*) significance levels.
Table 9: Matched difference in the first asking price of diesel vehicles by seller type.
Month after disclosure of the emission scandal
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Private seller 346 475 771** 481 398 536 393
(324) (324) (334) (347) (279) (338) (314)
Professional car dealer 179 -254* -32 -3 -310** -57 105
(128) (130) (127) (147) (143) (148) (143)
Professional car dealer providing 375 -22 -640* 430 -206 22 488
warranty (381) (394) (359) (377) (354) (359) (371)
Professional car dealer not -6 -240 35 -255 -194 -286** 50
providing warranty (156) (152) (158) (188) (155) (140) (154)
Notes: This table reports the matched difference-in-differences in the first asking price (in euros) of used diesel
vehicles for the first seven months after the disclosure of the VW emission scandal by seller type. Diesel cars are
matched at the individual car level such that they share the same characteristics. The first matched difference
is between the time before and after the disclosure of the VW emission scandal. The second matched difference
is between VW and other car makes. The other car makes include Mercedes, BMW, Opel, Ford, Renault,
Peugeot, Fiat, and Toyota diesel cars. The standard errors in parentheses are calculated with a non-parametric
bootstrap (499 replications). The asterisks indicate 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% (*) significance levels.
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